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Charter of Rights and Freedoms
Charter remedies [s. 24] — Stay of proceedings — Stay of extradition — Applicant illegally detained, physically mistreated, denied rights to consular access, and delayed in repatriation — All violations of rights
partly responsibility of requesting state — Requesting state seeking benefit based on
own misconduct — Stay available on residual basis — Sum of human rights violations shocking and unjustifiable and making facts fall into clearest of cases requiring stay of proceedings.
Extradition proceedings
Extradion from Canada — Evidence at hearing —
General principles — Manifestly unreliable evidence — Statement taken while applicant illegally detained subsequent to physical mistreatment — No access to counsel — Applicant handcuffed and shackled during three days of interrogation —
Statement manifestly unreliable and not admissible for extradition purposes — Subsequent statement in which accused asked to confirm particulars of first statement
derivative and also excluded — Statement in which accused told free to leave and
told to ignore any previous statements admissible.
The United States of America sought the extradition of the applicant to face terrorismrelated charges. The applicant had been taken into custody by the Pakistani Intelligence
Agency, the ISI, and held in a secret detention centre for approximately fourteen months
before he was released and repatriated to Canada. He had been interrogated by American
FBI agents while in Pakistan and had given them a statement. He also gave a statement to
CSIS following his return to Canada, and shortly after that gave a second statement to
FBI officials. The applicant sought a stay of proceedings of the extradition hearing on the
basis that there was misconduct attributable to the Requesting State, the United States of
America, on a level so serious that it would violate the fundamental principles of justice
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which underlie the community's sense of fair play and decency. In the alternative, the
applicant argued that the three statements should not be admitted or relied upon and
therefore could not form the basis for an extradition order.
Held: The application was granted and a stay was ordered.
A stay of proceedings can be ordered when there has been state misconduct affecting the
fairness of proceedings. A stay can also be ordered on the residual ground that state conduct has so strongly contravened fundamental notions of justice that to continue would
undermine the integrity of the judicial process. In either case the unfairness must be such
that it would be manifested by continuing with the proceeding, and there must be no other
remedy capable of remedying the prejudice. In the extradition context, a stay can still be
granted on the residual ground even if the fairness of the extradition proceeding is not at
issue. Although the Minister of Justice also has authority under the Extradition Act to
refuse to grant a surrender order if the surrender would be unjust or oppressive having
regard to all the relevant circumstances, that does not remove the jurisdiction of a court to
grant the remedy of a stay.
Here, there was little disagreement over the core facts of the application. The applicant
had been captured in Pakistan by the ISI at the behest of the United States, who paid a
$500,000 bounty for his arrest. He was initially sought by American officials solely for
intelligence purposes and not for criminal prosecution purposes. The applicant's detention by the ISI was both arbitrary and illegal under the law of Pakistan. During the initial
three days of his detention, the applicant was mistreated and physically abused, although
not on the level of severity he alleged in his affidavit. The United States intelligence
agency did not have actual knowledge that the applicant would be abused when it paid
the bounty for his arrest, but it ought to have known that there was a credible risk he
would be mistreated. Further, the applicant's rights to consular access without delay were
denied by Pakistan. The United States and Pakistan collaborated in this delay in order to
facilitate the completion of American intelligence interrogations. The United States intelligence agency also pressured the ISI to delay the applicant's repatriation to Canada for a
period of six months, due to their dissatisfaction with the decision to return him to Canada without charges being laid. This delay was contrary to Canadian officials' expectations and wishes.
The misconduct did not compromise the fairness of the extradition hearing. However, the
gross misconduct that occurred in Pakistan did affect the proceedings. The basis of the
case had its genesis in the serious misconduct by the Requesting State, which was now
seeking a benefit based on evidence derived from its own misconduct. The sum of the
human rights violations suffered by the applicant was both shocking and unjustifiable.
The United States was the driving force behind the applicant's fourteen-month detention
in Pakistan, paying a $500,000 bounty for his apprehension. The United States intelligence agency acted in concert with the ISI to delay consular access by Canadian officials
to the applicant for three months, contrary to the provisions of the Vienna Convention.
The United States, contrary to Canada's wishes, pressured the ISI to delay the applicant's
repatriation because of its dissatisfaction with him being released without charge, even
though there was no admissible evidence upon which to base charges at that time. Given
this gross misconduct, this was one of the clearest of cases and wan-anted a stay.
Had a stay not been granted, two of the three statements sought to be used would not
have been admissible. The statement taken by FBI agents in Pakistan was manifestly
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unreliable. It was taken while the accused was subject to an illegal detention, was still in
the control of the people who had beaten him earlier, and was electronically monitored by
them during the interrogation. Further, he had had no meaningful opportunity to consult
with counsel and been handcuffed and shackled through the three long days of interrogation. In addition to being manifestly unreliable, the evidence was gathered in an abusive
fashion. Faced with similar limitations, Canadian officials had declined to interview the
applicant while he was still in Pakistan.
The second statement taken by FBI agents fell for the same reasons as the first. Although
the applicant voluntarily agreed to speak with the agents upon his return to Canada, the
entire interview amounted to an attempt to have him confirm the particulars of the statement made in Pakistan. The second statement was entirely derivative of the first, manifestly unreliable, one and so was equally unreliable.
The statement made to CSIS agents in Canada would have been admissible. The applicant was made aware that he was not under arrest and was free to leave at any time. He
was specifically told to disregard any statements he may have made in Pakistan. No
promises or threats were made in order to induce him to make a statement, and even
though he was not under detention, the applicant was fully advised of his right to counsel
and his right to silence. The video recording of the interview showed that there was nothing harsh or aggressive about the manner in which questions were posed, and the applicant did not in any way appear intimidated.
The one admissible statement would, had a stay not been entered, have authorized the
applicant's extradition on many, but not all, of the charges for which extradition was
sought.
Annotation
The decision in Khadr is an important affirmation of the importance of rights, particular
those which must be respected in the international community. Justice Speyer's judgment
is a balanced one. He does not accept all the evidence of abuse put forward by the applicant, basing his decision instead on the facts on which there was wide agreement. He also
recognises with his assessment of the admissibility of statements that, despite any abuse
that Khadr did suffer, his extradition to face terrorism-related charges in the United States
could have been warranted. The decision not to extradite, then, and to grant a stay instead, is starkly a recognition that the cause of "fighting terrorism" is not a justification
for exceptionalism and the abandonment of basic standards that have been recognized for
decades in international conventions. As Justice Speyer noted, "[a]lthough Khadr may
have possessed information of intelligence value, he is still entitled to the safeguards and
benefit of the law, and not to arbitrary and illegal detention in a secret detention centre
where he was subjected to physical abuse."
In this case, the abuses suffered by Khadr were traceable to actions of the Requesting
State, the United States of America. In the absence of any desire to lay criminal charges,
they had offered a bounty to Pakistan for Khadr's arrest. They had done this knowing of
Pakistan's reputation for human rights abuses and therefore of the likelihood of mistreatment. This detention by the Pakistani Intelligence Service was unlawful, even under Pakistan's domestic law. The United States then interfered with strong efforts by Canada to
obtain consular access to Khadr, a Canadian citizen: they successfully delayed that access
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by three months, thereby violating the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations. They
then pressured Pakistan to resist Canada's attempts to repatriate Khadr, extending his
detention by a further six months. In those circumstances, the Requesting State had disqualified itself from being able to seek extradition:
Misconduct of this sort cannot ever be tolerated, for to do so is to condone,
perhaps even to invite, similar conduct in the future. This is the kind of conduct that offends this community's sense of fair play and decency. Having
conducted itself in this manner, the requesting state is disentitled to any relief
from this court, (para. 138, quoting United States v. Tollman, [2006] O.J. No.
3672 (Ont. S.C.J.))
Canada has a limited ability to see to it that other states respect their obligations at international law. This case nonetheless helps send the signal that other states fail to do so at
their own risk, if they wish Canada's cooperation.
Steve Coughlan
Schulich School of Law, Dalhousie University
Annotation
This is a noteworthy, even important, decision for a number of reasons. First, it serves to
underscore the uneasy nexus between intelligence-gathering and evidence-gathering,
which is beginning to surface in the case law. Here, despite the United States' apparent
desire to prosecute Khadr criminally, that effort was torpedoed by what happened during
the intelligence-gathering phase — specifically, their participation in gross violations of
Khadr's human rights, which ultimately prevented his extradition. This was despite the
fact that Canadian officials were scrupulous in taking statements in a way that would be
admissible at trial.
Second, Speyer J.'s decision demonstrates the power of the court's abuse of process remedy, which is seldom successfully invoked in extradition matters. Despite the traditional
reluctance of Canadian courts to adjudge upon anything that takes place outside our borders, courts must nonetheless dissociate themselves from any conduct which poisons the
integrity and fairness of the proceedings. Given the increasing amount and complexity of
inter-state cooperation in criminal matters, scrutinizing the conduct of foreign authorities
is imperative. Even in light of the importance of international comity, Canadian courts
should not allow our justice system to be implicated in foreign abuses of basic rights and
freedoms.
Third, Abdullah Khadr's case (as with that of his brother, Omar) shows how important
international law principles are becoming to the practice of criminal law in Canada. Here,
the impugned actions are those of the governments of Pakistan and the U.S., and it is
reasonably clear that it was the international law effects of their actions that drove the
result. For example, at paragraph 120, Justice Speyer implicitly finds that Pakistan and
the U.S. breached the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations', elsewhere, he finds it
relevant that Canada asked Pakistan to observe international human rights standards and
makes it clear that this was not done. Both of these were important elements of the ultimate finding that the U.S. was abusing the court's process by requesting extradition, but
there was little legal analysis of either.
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In fact, substantially more international law analysis than was used here was available to
the court, and could have fleshed out the legal basis for the decision considerably. Speyer
J. examines the conduct of Pakistan and the U.S., finds it to have amounted to "gross"
and "serious" misconduct respectively, and concludes that this amounts to abuse of process. However, this is more of a factual conclusion than a legal one. Why was this behaviour held to be "misconduct?" Because it was unlawful — and yet it is clearly not Canadian law that was breached, but rather international law. A number of interesting
international law questions thus arise: Did Pakistan's actions breach international human
rights law? Which rights? Are Pakistan's actions attributable to the U.S. under the international law of state responsibility? What effect should that have upon the extradition
process?
This is not to say that the result in this case would have been any different if the international law analysis had been more complete. However, there would have been a firmer
basis for how and why the unlawful actions of foreign states prevented this extradition. It
would also give counsel on both sides more specific focus for their arguments. And since,
as the court points out, the abuse of process remedy is meant to have a deterrent effect, all
the better for all concerned if the deterrent is as specific as possible.
Rob Currie
Schulich School of Law, Dalhousie University
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APPLICATION for stay of proceedings ordering accused's extradition to United States
for terrorism-related offences.

Speyer J.:
Introduction
A stay of proceedings is granted rarely. It is a remedy of last resort that must
meet the "clearest of cases" standard. It is an exceptional remedy because its
effect is to deprive society of adjudication on the merits.
The central issue in this extradition proceeding is whether the applicant,
Abdullah Khadr ("Khadr"), has established misconduct attributable to the Requesting State, the United States of America, on a level so serious that it would
violate those fundamental principles of justice which underlie the community's
sense of fair play and decency. The applicant seeks a stay of proceedings pursuant to section 24( 1) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of
the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.),
1982, c. 11 ('Charter") and the inherent jurisdiction of this court to prevent an
abuse of process.
In the event the stay of proceedings application is unsuccessful, the applicant
raises two other significant issues:
(i)

Should the inculpatory statements contained in the Record of the
Case ("ROC") be excluded from these proceedings pursuant to section 24(2) of the Charter and the common law confession rule?

(ii)

Are the statements in the ROC "manifestly unreliable" for the purposes of section 29(1) of the Extradition Act, S.C. 1999, c. 18 ("Extradition Act")!

Extradition hearings are not concerned with guilt or innocence. Because the
right to make full answer and defence is not engaged, Stinchcombe-type disclosure is not required in the overwhelming majority of extradition proceedings. A
person sought for extradition is entitled to know the case against him: this is
found in the ROC relied upon by the Requesting State to establish a prima facie
case. No other disclosure is usually required.
This is an exceptional case on many levels; one relates to disclosure. On the
basis there was a justiciable issue to be determined involving allegations of torture and other cruel and abusive conduct, voluminous disclosure in the posses-
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sion of Canadian government departments or agencies was voluntarily provided
to the applicant by the Attorney General, subject to a very extensive redacting of
documents. This enhanced level of disclosure was provided because the applicant's claims of abuse while in detention in Pakistan had an "air of reality" and
were sufficient to provide a realistic possibility that the remedies sought could
be achieved. I declined the applicant's request to order disclosure from the
United States. I ruled that to do so would give the Charter impermissible extraterritorial application. I will return to the unredacted disclosure provided later in
these reasons.
6
The scope of this hearing was expanded because the justiciable issue concerning inhuman and degrading treatment required determination. With the cooperation of counsel, and for reasons of economy and convenience, a blended
hearing was conducted for the purpose of adjudicating all issues. When I refer to
a blended hearing, I speak of the calling of all viva voce evidence relevant to all
issues raised. When the evidence over a three week period was concluded, argument ensued on the stay of proceeding issue, separate but inter-related issues of
statements taken in both Canada and in a foreign jurisdiction, and the ultimate
issue of whether there was sufficient evidence to support a committal order.
Overview
I. History of Proceedings
1
The United States of America requests the extradition of Abdullah Khadr to
stand trial in Boston, Massachusetts, on terrorism-related charges. It is alleged
that Khadr procured various munitions and explosive components to be used by
Al Qaeda against the United States and Coalition Forces in Afghanistan. The
corresponding or parallel Canadian crimes identified by the Attorney General
are terrorism, weapons and explosives offences contrary to the Criminal Code of
Canada, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46 ("Criminal Code").
8
On October 15, 2004, Pakistan's federal intelligence service, Inter-Services
Intelligence Directorate ("ISI"), apprehended the applicant in Islamabad, Pakistan. He was detained in a secret detention centre for approximately fourteen
months before his release and repatriation to Canada on December 2, 2005.
9

Khadr alleges the ISI subjected him to harsh and inhuman treatment while in
detention, including torture. The applicant also alleges threatening conduct by
United States intelligence agency officials who interrogated him for seventeen
days: an interrogation that commenced four days following his apprehension by
the ISI.
10
The evidence forming the foundation of the terrorism-related charges consists solely of three inculpatory statements made by the applicant. The first statement was taken by two FBI agents over a three day period in July 2005, while
the applicant remained in a secret detention centre in Pakistan: this occurred
nine months after his apprehension.
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The second statement was taken on December 2, 2005 by Detective Inspector Shourie of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police ("RCMP") immediately after
the applicant disembarked in Toronto from Pakistan. This statement was videotaped and took place in an interview room at Pearson International Airport.
The third statement was taken in Toronto on December 4, 2005, two days
following the applicant's repatriation to Canada: this statement was taken by the
same FBI agents who interviewed Khadr in July 2005 in Islamabad.
When the applicant arrived in Canada on December 2, 2005, there were no
outstanding charges against him and he was not under arrest. Upon leaving Pearson Airport, after providing his videotaped statement, the applicant was driven
by the RCMP officers to his family residence in Toronto.
On December 16, 2005, a Provisional Arrest Warrant was issued pursuant to
section 13 of the Extradition Act and Khadr was arrested one day later. Khadr
was denied bail by Justice Molloy on December 17, 2005 and subsequently by
Justice Trotter on August 19, 2008: he has been in custody since the date of his
arrest.
The criminal charges, the subject of this extradition proceeding, were filed
against applicant in Boston, Massachusetts. A Request for Extradition was made
to Canada, dated February 9, 2006. Pursuant to s. 15 of the Extradition Act, an
Authority to Proceed ("ATP") dated March 15, 2006 was issued on behalf of the
Minister of Justice, authorizing the Attorney General to seek an order for the
committal of the applicant.
The Canadian offences which correspond to the alleged conduct in the ATP
are the following:
• Directly or indirectly providing or making property available knowing
that, in whole or in part, it will be used by or will benefit a terrorist group
contrary to section 83.03(b) of the Criminal Code;
• Knowingly participating in or contributing to, directly or indirectly, any
activity of a terrorist group for the purpose of enhancing the ability of the
terrorist group to facilitate or carry out a terrorist activity contrary to section 83.18 of the Criminal Code;
• Conspiracy to traffic in weapons contrary to sections 99 and 465(1 )(c) of
the Criminal Code;
• Possession of an explosive substance contrary to section 82(1) of the
Criminal Code;
•

17
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Commission of an indictable offence for the benefit of, at the direction
of, or in association with, a terrorist group contrary to section 83.2 of the
Criminal Code.

On March 15, 2006, counsel for Khadr was served with a copy of the ROC
dated February 9, 2006. Subsequently, four Supplementary ROCs ("SROCs")
have been filed in these proceedings.
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In August, 2006, counsel for Khadr filed a motion for disclosure of all documents in the possession of Canada, the United States of America and third parties relating to issues raised by a "Voir Dire and Stay Application": the stay
application and request for a voir dire were grounded upon allegations of torture
and other cruel and inhuman treatment of Khadr while he was illegally detained
in Pakistan. The evidentiary foundation for the disclosure motion was found in
Khadr's lengthy 226 paragraph affidavit.

//. Proceedings in the Federal Court of Canada
19
As noted, much of the voluminous material provided to Khadr by the Attorney General was redacted on grounds that such disclosure would cause injury to
Canada's national security and international relations. Not surprisingly, counsel
for Khadr sought the production of unredacted copies of the disclosed material.
This was another matter beyond my jurisdiction and required an application to
the Federal Court pursuant to section 38.04(2) (c) of the Canada Evidence Act,
R.S.C. 1985, c. C-5 ("CE4").
20
Justice Richard Mosley was designated by the Chief Justice of the Federal
Court to conduct the hearing under s. 38(4) of the CEA. Following a full hearing, Justice Mosley ruled on the application on April 29, 2008.
21
Justice Mosley concluded the public interest in disclosure of relevant material to the applicant outweighed that of non-disclosure. Accordingly, he exercised his discretion to authorize disclosure of relevant information in the form of
summaries of relevant documents. In arriving at this conclusion, Justice Mosley
provided two sets of reasons: the first set is public, found at Khadr v. Canada
(Attorney General), [2008] F.C.J. No. 770 (F.C.), and the second set private.
Justice Mosley's private reasons contained the summaries of redacted material.
This decision also set the stage for the next procedural debate between the parties. The issue focused on whether this court ought to sit in closed session when
information contained in Justice Mosley's private reasons was received in
evidence.
///. Application to Close the Court to the Public
22
The Attorney General argued this extradition hearing ought to be closed to
the general public when information contained in the judicial summaries of Justice Mosley was disclosed. I ruled the court was to remain open.
23
In a nutshell, I noted Justice Mosley had specifically not made it a condition
of disclosure that the unredacted material be heard in camera. Indeed, the judge
clearly contemplated the possibility of disclosure of the materials in open court,
and specifically tailored the summaries with that possibility in mind. Most importantly, he was satisfied the public interest in disclosure still outweighed the
public interest in nondisclosure in the event I declined to hear such evidence in
closed session.
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I ruled the presumptive "open court principle" had not been displaced. I concluded that, given the enhanced public interest in this proceeding and Khadr's
right to a fair and public hearing, closing the court each time redacted information was mentioned would seriously detract from the public's understanding of
the totality of the evidence and also make the orderly management of this proceeding difficult.

The Evidence
25
Somewhat surprisingly, at the conclusion of the hearing all the evidence, and
with an important exception relating to the applicant's credibility, it became evident that most of the facts bearing on the resolution of the legal issues were not a
matter of great controversy. It is the interpretation of those facts and the application of the appropriate legal principles which are at issue. In this section, I attempt to highlight some of the evidence that pertains to Khadr's detention.

26

/. Evidence Called by the Applicant
The applicant led evidence relevant to his detention and allegations of abuse.
He submitted three affidavits: one was his own, upon which he was extensively
cross-examined; the remaining two affidavits, to which I will refer shortly, relate
to the domestic law of Pakistan at the time of these events and Pakistan's reputation for human rights violations. In addition, the applicant called a psychiatrist,
Dr. Leslie Payne, who interviewed Khadr five months following his return to
Canada. Dr. Payne opined the applicant was suffering from post-traumatic stress
disorder, consistent with a history of detention and torture in Pakistan. Dr.
Payne's evidence was relevant to Khadr's mental state when he gave his December 2, 2005 statement at Pearson Airport.

//. Witnesses Called by the Attorney General
27
The Attorney General called five witnesses, including two from the Canadian Security Intelligence Service ("CSIS") and two from the RCMP. A fifth
witness, Dr. Michael First, a psychiatrist, disagreed with Dr. Payne's diagnosis
that Khadr suffered from post-traumatic stress disorder. He testified that posttraumatic stress disorder is reserved for cases of "intense psychological distress". Dr. First was of the opinion that Khadr did suffer from a chronic adjustment disorder, which he described as a maladaptive reaction to his life circumstances. Dr. First, like Dr. Payne, testified as to his opinion with respect to
Khadr's mental state when he provided his videotaped statement at Pearson
Airport.
28
"John" was the senior CSIS official on the ground in Pakistan during the
period of the applicant's detention. In order to protect John's identity, he testified behind a screen and used a pseudonym. John gave his evidence in a candid
and frank manner.
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John's evidence is vital to the unfolding of events. John was the officer who
directly interacted with representatives of the two other intelligence agencies involved in this case, ISI and an American agency. It is noteworthy that the ISI
refused to deal with other Canadian government departments or agencies: its
policy was to deal directly with other intelligence agencies. As a consequence of
this policy, John became Canada's point man. It was John who arranged and
organized the consular visits for Department of Foreign Affairs and International
Trade (DFAIT) officials when such visits were eventually permitted. It was John
who facilitated the interviews conducted by the RCMP with Khadr in April
2005. It was John who interviewed Khadr, from time to time, for intelligence
purposes in his capacity as an intelligence officer. It was John's testimony that
interpreted and shed light on facts contained in the summaries disclosed by Justice Mosley.
30
"Christine" is a second CSIS officer who testified. Christine also testified
behind a screen and used a pseudonym to protect her identity. The scope of
Christine's testimony is limited to remarks made by the applicant while she accompanied him home to Canada on December 2, 2005 from Islamabad to Toronto. During that trip, Khadr advised the CSIS officer of the details of the abuse
he suffered in the initial days of his detention.
31

Detective Inspector Shourie was called as a witness by the Attorney General.
He is the RCMP officer who took the December 2, 2005 videotaped statement of
the applicant at the Pearson Airport. He was called on the issue of the voluntary
nature of this statement. Detective Inspector Shourie also testified as to the part
he played in the investigation of the applicant with a view to potentially laying
criminal charges against Khadr if sufficient evidence came to light. It was for
this purpose that this witness went to Islamabad in April 2005 to interview the
applicant in the hope of obtaining a Charter compliant statement.
32
The final Crown witness called was Constable Tarek Mokdad. This witness
was a junior officer to Detective Inspector Shourie and was called primarily with
respect to the voluntary nature of the December 2, 2005 statement.
///. Pakistani Law, the ISI and Human Rights
33
CSIS is an intelligence agency. Its mandate is to collect and analyze information relating to Canada's national security and report to government. The evidence establishes that Canada is a net consumer of intelligence and dependent
upon foreign governments sharing their intelligence.
34

The ISI is Pakistan's senior federal intelligence agency. CSIS has a "nontraditional" or "liaison relationship" with ISI based on sharing threat-related intelligence. An illuminating perspective of the ISI is captured in an e-mail dated
March 31, 2005 from the RCMP liaison officer in Islamabad to RCMP headquarters. The ISI is graphically described as "the most powerful in the country
and may even act autonomously from the government. The ISI view law en-
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forcement, whether local or western, as low priority and a possible source of
embarrassment."
Pakistan became a critical partner for the United States in the aftermath of
the tragic events that occurred on September 11, 2001. John's evidence is that
the Pakistanis, with the prompting of the international community and particularly the United States, were involved in the arrests of hundreds of individuals
believed to be affiliated with Al Qaeda.
Normally, the law of a foreign state and its record for respect of human
rights are not matters for consideration at the judicial phase of an extradition
hearing. Those are matters reserved for the executive stage. However, John's
understanding of Pakistani law as it relates to Khadr had a bearing on the actions
he took. More importantly, the issue of abuse and the arbitrariness of Khadr's
detention are central to this proceeding.
Two affidavits were filed by the applicant: one from Professor Javaid
Rehman, a professor of law in London, England, with an expertise in the domestic law of Pakistan; the other from Syed Ali Hasan, principal researcher for
Human Rights Watch in Pakistan. Neither affiant was cross examined on their
respective affidavits.
It is not disputed that Pakistan, during the period of Khadr's detention, had a
troubled record with respect to human rights. Canadian officials, when serving
in Pakistan, were familiar with this fact. Americans were similarly familiar with
Pakistan's problematic human rights record. The United States Department of
State, in its 2003 Report on Human Rights, cautioned that security force personnel continued to torture persons in custody in Pakistan.
The evidence indicates that in Pakistan, while laws applicable to the detention of prisoners are substantially similar to our own laws, failure to comply
with procedural safeguards is prevalent. Indeed, in the Crown factum, counsel
for the Attorney General puts it this way:
It is clear from the evidence filed by Khadr in the affidavit of Ali Hasan that
while Pakistan has a constitution which in many ways appears to resemble
Canada's, the rights it confers are generally disregarded in practice. The documentation also reveals the reasons for this. Pakistan is a developing country
plagued by poverty and an unstable political environment which shifts back
and forth from civilian to military control. When the events at bar occurred,
the country was essentially under military control with a civilian facade.

40

Professor Rehman deposes that Pakistan's constitutional law and anti-terrorism legislation allow for detention up to and beyond the fourteen month period.
However, there are strict procedural requirements with respect to "preventive
detention" which were clearly not observed in the case of Khadr.

41

John described his knowledge of Pakistani law with respect to "administrative detention," or "preventive detention," as a "basic layman's understanding".
He found it confusing because there seemed to be several functioning systems of
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law occurring simultaneously with overlapping jurisdictions. It was his understanding, based on advice given to him that a person held in "administrative
detention" such as Khadr was not entitled to a lawyer.
42
It is clear that, even if the Pakistani authorities had the right to arrest Khadr
for valid national security concerns, their failure to comply with procedural safeguards made his detention not only arbitrary but also illegal in Pakistan. Moreover, as John noted in his evidence, the ISI did not have a track record for moving
people in their detention into the functioning Pakistani criminal justice system.

43
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IV.Pre-Arrest Circumstances
Abdullah Khadr is a Canadian citizen. He spent many years of his life living
with family in either Pakistan or Afghanistan. After his father's violent death in
October 2003, Khadr and his family moved from Afghanistan to Islamabad, Pakistan. Certain information provided by the applicant's brother, Abdurahman
Khadr, informed intelligence agencies that the applicant was affiliated with the
organization Al Qaeda.
This, and other information in the possession of CSIS, led the agency to
believe the applicant was as a national security risk. Intelligence information
relating to Khadr was shared amongst CSIS, the American agency, and ISI.
In late September 2004, Khadr phoned the CSIS offices in Toronto and indicated a willingness to provide this agency with important intelligence information. Khadr informed the CSIS official, "I am willing to tell you everything I
know." Subsequent events overtook Khadr's proposal.
In early October 2004, CSIS was informed by American authorities that
Khadr's arrest in Pakistan was imminent. The affidavit of a senior official in the
Counter-Terrorism Division of the Federal Bureau of Investigation ("FBI") deposes that American authorities were interested in speaking to Khadr, whom
they felt might possess information regarding future terrorist threats against the
United States in addition to general information relating to Al Qaeda. Importantly, it is clear and explicit in the affidavit that the interviews conducted by the
United States intelligence agency with Khadr were done for intelligence purposes and not for criminal investigative purposes. What was not contained in the
ROC or the SROCs, including the affidavit, was the fact that a $500,000 bounty
was paid by the Americans to the ISI for Khadr's arrest. This came to light in
the wake of the unredacted disclosure ordered by Justice Mosley.
In response to the information concerning Khadr's anticipated arrest in Pakistan, CSIS drafted a communique to ISI requesting ISI follow accepted norms of
international conventions and due process of law. Further, the communique
asked that, if Khadr was detained in Pakistan, he be allowed consular access.
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V. The Applicant's Claims of Abuse
Khadr was arrested by the ISI in Islamabad on October 15, 2004. He was
interrogated by members of ISI for three days. In his affidavit, the applicant
alleges he was subjected each day to acts of unspeakable abuse and cruelty. In
his affidavit, Khadr deposes these acts included the infliction of excruciating
pain; acts of sexual humiliation including the squeezing of his testicles and penetration of his rectum with a stick; physical beatings; threats of harm to both him
and his sister; and the deprivation of food, sleep and medical treatment.

49

The abuse he suffered in Pakistan, a matter in dispute, was not disclosed by
Khadr for the first time in his affidavit. On the flight to Canada from Pakistan on
December 2, 2005, the applicant spoke to the CSIS officer, Christine, who was
accompanying him back to Toronto. Christine did not identify herself as a CSIS
member, but held herself out to Khadr as a representative of the High Commission in Islamabad. She described Khadr's demeanour throughout the trip as relaxed, comfortable and talkative.

50

On second leg of the trip, from Manchester, England to Toronto, Christine
testified Khadr told her that this was the first opportunity he had had to speak to
a Canadian official alone, and that he wanted to tell her what had happened.
Christine emphasized on several occasions he was under no obligation to do so.
Christine's evidence is the applicant told her that he was beaten about the head
area by Pakistani officials for two hours just after he was arrested: in particular,
one blow to his head caused his ear to bleed for weeks thereafter. He further
advised Christine that, when it became apparent to Pakistani officials that he
was willing cooperate with them, the physical abuse stopped. Further, he told
Christine, on the day following this physically abusive treatment, Pakistani officials apologized for what occurred a day earlier. Khadr also told Christine that
during the first three weeks of his detention, he was forced to stand for extended
periods and was not allowed to sleep for more than two to three hours per night.
VI. Delayed Notification to Canadian Officials by the ISI of Khadr's
Detention and the Refusal to Permit Consular Access for Three Months

51

Reports surfaced in Pakistani newspapers of the arrest of a Canadian citizen.
On October 19, 2004, American authorities privately advised Canadian officials
of Khadr's arrest. On October 24, 2004, a United States intelligence agency advised CSIS that debriefmgs of the applicant were continuing and that it was important to allow intelligence aspects to play out before official representations
were made by any element of the government of Canada.

52

John met with an ISI official on October 28, 2004. The purpose of the meeting was for CSIS to obtain confirmation from ISI that Khadr was being detained.
The ISI official refused to confirm the fact that Khadr was in Pakistani custody.
It was John's impression that the ISI were stalling acknowledging Khadr's arrest
because he was still being interrogated. It was John's opinion that the ISI be-
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lieved if Canadian authorities demanded full consular access, the operational
value of Khadr's information would be diminished.
Faced with the unwillingness of the Pakistani intelligence agency to confirm
Khadr's detention, John arranged a meeting, held on November 10, 2004, with a
more senior member of the ISI. At that meeting, the ISI officer advised John that
Khadr was being held. John was advised that Khadr was in good health and
being well-treated. John brought up the issue of the Canadian government seeking consular access. The ISI, for a second time, raised concerns with the issue of
consular access while Khadr was still being debriefed. This senior ISI official
indicated that if the Canadian government pressured Pakistan for consular access
through DFAIT, the ISI might be forced to release Khadr to Canada. In such
circumstances the official believed the Canadian government could not arrest
Khadr, nor would they want to.
It was at this meeting of November 10, 2004 that John learned the ISI were
investigating Khadr for possible involvement in an assassination attempt of a
senior Pakistani political figure.
On December 2, 2004, a United States intelligence agency indicated to CSIS
that Khadr had been generally cooperative and that his human rights continued
to be respected. The communique indicated that Khadr had provided the agency
with Al Qaeda-related information. The reason for his continued investigative
detention was to identify locations where other suspected Al Qaeda associates
might be found. American authorities indicated that, once their operations were
completed, Khadr would be moved out of investigative detention. The message
stated, "In the meantime, we ask for your Service's patience in obtaining access
to Khadr." This is the second time the United States agency requested CSIS's
forbearance in insisting on prompt consular access.
By December 20, 2004, a senior Pakistani official indicated to John that
Khadr might be transferred into the regular Pakistani legal system. John's opinion was that, while this was hopeful and a positive step, he was sceptical because he did not see any track record of the ISI being willing or capable of
moving individuals into the criminal justice system.

VII. Consular Visits in 2005
57
On January 12, 2005, DFAIT officials were permitted, for the first time, to
visit Khadr. The visit was monitored by ISI officers. In addition to the physical
presence of a Pakistani official, John's evidence was that it was to be assumed
that every visit, whether for consular or intelligence briefing purposes, was electronically monitored by Pakistani authorities.
58
Khadr was permitted a second consular visit three months later, on April 14,
2005. This was in advance of the RCMP arriving to conduct their interviews.
59
A third consular meeting occurred on June 17, 2005, followed by another on
September 7, 2005. The final meeting took place on November 19, 2005. John
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was present at all of these meetings, with the exception of the first one. Even
there, he interviewed Khadr on the same day following the conclusion of the
first consular visit.
60

At the April 14, 2005 consular visit, Khadr was asked if he knew a lawyer
named Dennis Edney. He replied no. When told that he was a Canadian lawyer,
Khadr replied that he did not know who he was but perhaps his mother had hired
him. He was asked if Edney was his lawyer and he replied no.

61

At none of the consular visits did Khadr complain about physical abuse, nor
did he appear to exhibit physical signs of ill treatment. On the other hand, he
was not asked if he had been abused nor were the circumstances of his detention
such that he could not speak freely without fear of reprisals.
VIII. The RCMP Visit and the Interviews on April 16-19, 2005

62

Detective Inspector Shourie, from the time of Khadr's arrest, understood that
gathering evidence sufficient to charge Khadr would pose significant legal challenges. By March 2005, the ISI had exhausted Khadr as an intelligence source
and wanted the RCMP to charge him and take him back to Canada. When
Detective Inspector Shourie went to Pakistan in April 2005, he hoped to persuade Pakistani officials to permit conditions which would allow for the taking
of a legally admissible statement to be used in a criminal prosecution. The ISI
refused the RCMP's request to videotape the statement, or to allow Khadr access to a Canadian lawyer for legal advice: a further restriction imposed was any
interview must be conducted in the presence of a Pakistani official. Accordingly,
Detective Inspector Shourie decided not to take a statement for law enforcement
purposes.

63

However, Detective Inspector Shourie did meet with Khadr and questioned
him from an intelligence perspective with a view to gathering a greater insight
into the intelligence-related information Khadr possessed. Shourie also acknowledged that he wished to establish a rapport with Khadr in the event the two men
had further and future dealings.
IX.January-June 2005: Khadr's potential Repatriation to Canada

64

Beginning in early 2005, and certainly by March 2005, ISI no longer saw
Khadr as an active producer of intelligence leads: his usefulness was spent.
John's evidence put it succinctly when he stated that the ISI was good at capturing and killing militants and at interrogating prisoners, but not very effective at
building cases and moving persons into the criminal justice system in Pakistan.
ISI authorities spoke less and less to John about moving Khadr into the Pakistan's criminal justice system.

65

In March 2005, the United States was also attempting to persuade the ISI to
move Khadr into the Pakistani justice system but the ISI was nervous about anything to do with Pakistan's court system. Nor would ISI allow the FBI to inter-
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view Khadr at that time, for fear of information and names of ISI officers becoming public in a criminal court document.
66
in a letter dated March 11, 2005, the ISI advised CSIS that they were approving the RCMP request to interview Khadr and would like release him to
Canadian authorities following the interview. As previously noted, when the interview of Khadr took place in April, 2005, ISI restrictions and conditions did
not permit the type of interview acceptable by Canadian standards for criminal
prosecution purposes. After the interviews in Pakistan, the RCMP was not willing to take Khadr into custody because of a lack of evidence. Without charges
laid against him, the ISI declined to release Khadr in April, 2005.
67
By the end of May 2005, CSIS advised Canadian government officials that it
was improbable that Pakistan would wait much longer before releasing Khadr. It
would be three months before a determination could be made by the RCMP to
charge and request extradition of Khadr.
68
During the first couple of weeks of June 2005, CSIS had ongoing interactions with Khadr. John testified that Khadr continued to cooperate during this
period, that he was in overall good health, and that he wished to remain in contact with CSIS upon his return to Canada. It was also during this two week period that the ISI informed CSIS that the prosecution of Khadr in Pakistan was
not a viable option and that the ISI were not willing to detain him any longer.
The ISI indicated to CSIS that Khadr would be released and returned to Canada
on June 15, 2005. Consequently, Canadian officials made arrangements in preparation for Khadr's return to Canada.
69

On the evening of June 14, 2005, the evening before Khadr's planned release
and repatriation, John received a phone call from his American intelligence
counterpart telling him the United States agency disagreed with and was concerned about plans to repatriate Khadr to Canada. The United States believed
Khadr still posed a threat and that releasing him at this point was not a wise
course of action.
70
Following this telephone call from the American intelligence official, John
received a second phone call that evening from his senior liaison at the ISI. John
was told there was new evidence relating to Khadr's participation in criminal
activity in Pakistan and his release would be delayed. John testified that he made
plans to meet with his ISI liaison the next morning.
71
John met the senior ISI officer the following day, June 15, 2005. The ISI
official apologized for the cancellation of Khadr's repatriation. The ISI official
stated his organization had been asked by the United States government to
"stand down on the [Khadr] project." John summed up the situation his way:
Obviously, it was a bad situation. The pressure was on the Pakistanis. We
wanted obviously the release to go forward. The Pakistanis were under a lot
of pressure, but felt — I think they felt — they felt they were being pressured
from many sides. It was sort of an impasse.
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Nevertheless, the Pakistani official stated that the ISI would not release Khadr to
the United States without Canada's written authorization and that they would
not hold continue to hold him indefinitely.
72

in a later communication of August 11, 2005 from a United States agency,
the agency requested CSIS's patience during the course of a continuing United
States investigation and reassured CSIS that nothing would be done with Khadr
without the knowledge and consent of Canada, the United States, and Pakistan.
CSIS was of the view that the FBI and its criminal investigation was "driving
the agenda" and that the FBI intended to ask ISI to keep Khadr in investigative
detention. It was John's opinion that the delay in the repatriation was as a result
of the United States trying to move forward with a criminal prosecution.

73

On July 15, 2005, the ISI confirmed to CSIS that the FBI was being allowed
to interview Khadr. The interview conducted by FBI agents occurred over a
three day period from July 21-23, 2005 The ISI gave the FBI seven to ten days
to determine if they were going to charge Khadr. If no charges were laid by the
United States, Khadr would be sent back to Canada. It was John's opinion that
the FBI was asking the ISI to keep Khadr in investigative detention until extradition plans could be completed.

74

CSIS believed the ISI were not going to release Khadr to the United States
unless Canadian officials agreed. Further, Canada would not consent to the
American request that Khadr be moved directly from Pakistan to the United
States.

75

On August 28, 2005, a senior United States official confirmed to a DFAIT
official that the United States had no success in getting the Pakistanis to order
that Khadr be sent directly to the United States. The American official nevertheless expected that the United States could opt for rendition to the United States
to face criminal charges. The official asserted that the United States would do a
rendition the next day if not for the fact that the Pakistanis wanted Canada's
consent.

76

in a communication on November 1, 2005, ISI stated that it wanted to revert
to its June 2005 position and deal with Khadr's release. A couple of days later,
on November 4, 2005, a senior United States official inquired with DFAIT about
the possibility of delaying Khadr's release for a month in order to allow United
States officials to "get their act together" with respect to extradition plans. A
senior Canadian official denied the request.

77

The evidence establishes that by November 30, 2005, the eve of Khadr's
departure to Canada, Pakistan's Ministry of Foreign Affairs still had not publicly
acknowledged that Khadr was being detained in Pakistan.
X. Circumstances of the Pearson Airport Statement

78

When Khadr arrived at the Pearson Airport in Toronto, Detective Inspector
Shourie was present. There were other RCMP members; all were in plain
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clothes. Uniformed members of the Canada Border Services Agency ("CBSA")
and the Peel Regional Police were also present. It was Detective Inspector
Shourie's intention to keep Khadr's return "as low-key as possible."
79

Upon deplaning, Khadr was greeted by five uniformed CBSA officers. He
was then escorted to the customs area, where he saw Detective Inspector
Shourie. Khadr smiled and waved at Detective Inspector Shourie. They exchanged a few comments. Detective Inspector Shourie explained that he wanted
to speak with Khadr but that it was voluntary and there was no obligation.
Detective Inspector Shourie testified that he then "backed off from Khadr.

80

After Khadr cleared customs, CBSA officer Sebastian Nowak told him he
was free to leave but that the RCMP were interested in speaking with him if it
was "of his own free volition." Khadr responded that he was willing to speak
with the RCMP and requested a coffee and some water, which were provided. In
the presence of Nowak, Detective Inspector Shourie repeated that Khadr was not
obligated to speak with him, but Khadr advised that he "did not mind speaking."
Khadr agreed in cross-examination that no one at the airport told him that he had
to cooperate, even though he stated in his affidavit that he felt he had no choice
but to speak with Detective Inspector Shourie.

81

Khadr entered a small room in Terminal 3 with Detective Inspector Shourie.
The entire interview was video and audio recorded. The door to the interview
room was not locked and Khadr was repeatedly told he could leave whenever he
wanted. Detective Inspector Shourie emphasized to Khadr during the interview
that his participation was voluntary.

82

Detective Inspector Shourie gave Khadr a full caution, orally and in writing,
including a right to counsel and the phone number for Legal Aid. Khadr did not
wish to exercise his right to counsel. Khadr was told he was not under arrest.
Importantly, Detective Inspector Shourie advised Khadr that what he had told
Shourie in Pakistan was to have no impact or interfere with what was about to
be discussed.

83

Constable Mokdad was present during the interview. He described Khadr's
mood as friendly. Detective Inspector Shourie confirmed this interpretation of
Khadr's mood, stating that he laughed and joked during the interview. It was
Detective Inspector Shourie's opinion that Khadr "was relieved and was basically trying to get this stuff off his chest." In my view, Khadr's demeanour on
the videotape appears to be relaxed and friendly.

84

The interview lasted approximately two and a half hours, concluding at
5:05pm. Khadr was provided coffee and a washroom break.

85

FBI agents were in Toronto at the time of this interview. Detective Inspector
Shourie deliberately kept the FBI at a distance, even though they were present at
the Pearson Airport. While Khadr had originally agreed to meet with the FBI at
Pearson Airport at the end of his interview with the RCMP, he later changed his
mind. Detective Inspector Shourie then offered to give him a ride and escorted
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him through a route in the airport that would draw the least attention and would
keep them from encountering the FBI.
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XI. Circumstances of the Delta Statement
Two days after Khadr's return to Canada, Constable Mokdad called Khadr to
ask him how he was doing. Khadr called back and arranged to meet with Constable Mokdad and Detective Inspector Shourie at a fast food restaurant near his
home. Khadr attended with his brother to meet the officers. At the restaurant,
there was a casual conversation about Khadr's return to Canada and what he had
been doing over the previous couple of days.
Detective Inspector Shourie asked Khadr if he was still interested in speaking with the FBI and repeated that he was under no obligation to do so. Khadr
agreed to speak with the FBI, but wanted Detective Inspector Shourie to be
present.
Constable Mokdad assisted Khadr in accompanying his brother back to the
home, while Detective Inspector Shourie drove over. At the home, Khadr's
mother expressed apprehension about Khadr speaking with the FBI. Detective
Inspector Shourie told Khadr's mother that she could not be present during the
actual interview by the FBI, but that she could accompany him to the Delta
Hotel.
Detective Inspector Shourie, Constable Mokdad, Khadr, and Khadr's mother
drove to the Delta Hotel. Khadr's mother was concerned that Khadr would be
taken by the FBI, but Detective Inspector Shourie assured her that there was no
authorization to do so.
Upon arriving at the Delta Hotel, Detective Inspector Shourie and Khadr
went up to the room, while Khadr's mother and Constable Mokdad stayed
downstairs. Detective Inspector Shourie set up the camera while Khadr did his
prayers. The FBI team then entered the room.
Detective Inspector Shourie provided him with the appropriate Canadian
cautions and right to counsel, in both English and Arabic. After providing the
cautions, Detective Inspector Shourie moved to the background to allow the FBI
to conduct their interview.
The FBI interview was conducted by Galen Nace and Gregory Hughes, the
same FBI officials who had interviewed Khadr in Pakistan. Many of the questions posed during the Delta interview made reference to Khadr's previous statement in Pakistan. I consider this in further detail later in the judgment.
Detective Inspector Shourie's opinion was that Khadr's demeanour during
the Delta interview was similar to his demeanour during the Pearson Airport
statement. Khadr was forthright and cooperative in his responses.
Two weeks following the Delta statement, on December 17, 2005, Khadr
was arrested in Canada. He has been detained ever since.
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Findings of Fact
The events of September 11, 2001 mobilized international efforts to fight
terrorism. As John testified, Pakistan became a focus of the war on terrorism
because it was the centre of a global terrorist network. Pakistan is a country
where threat-related intelligence is gathered by many countries, including Canada and the United States. The gathering and collecting of information and intelligence in relation to national defence is of the highest importance. And so are
our democratic values, including respect for human rights and the primacy of the
rule of law.
The capture of Khadr in Pakistan on October 15, 2004 was entirely for intelligence-related purposes. The SROC #3 makes clear, as do the reasons of Justice
Mosley, the United States wished to interview Khadr with respect to potential
imminent terrorist threats as well as general information relating to Al Qaeda.
From the American perspective, Khadr's apprehension was not law enforcement-related. I stress this fact because this is a case where, in difficult times, the
reality of intelligence objectives collides with the protection of individual rights
and the rule of law.
Canada was tipped off shortly before Khadr's capture that his arrest in Pakistan was imminent. Pakistan, at the time of these events, had a troubled history
with respect to the violation of human rights. Canada immediately sent a communique to Pakistan requesting the ISI "to follow accepted norms of international conventions and due process of law and allow access to Canadian consular officials if Khadr is detained in Pakistan." Both Detective Inspector Shourie
and John gave evidence that the ISI was an intelligence agency that CSIS and
the RCMP do not traditionally deal with. The purpose of the communique was,
at least in part, to assert Canada's expectation that Khadr's rights would be adhered to.
It is clear, and I find for reasons that follow, that Pakistan failed to respect
international conventions and due process of law and failed to provide prompt
Canadian consular access to Khadr. Pakistan is not a litigant to this proceeding.
The important issue is whether the United States, who is a litigant, participated
with ISI officials in the violation of Khadr's human rights and thereby disentitled itself from the remedy it seeks from this court.
/. Allegations of Mistreatment

99

i. By the ISI
There is evidence from reliable American and Canadian public records that,
at the time of these events, Pakistan had a record for human rights violations.
The unchallenged affidavit evidence of Syed Ali Hasan supports this conclusion.
Moreover, a note from a December 22, 2004 meeting between the RCMP and
CSIS refers to Pakistan's "history of torture" and "national reputation for torture." The evidence of John was the ISI was an elite intelligence/military
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agency. He was not personally aware of instances of torture by the ISI, but testified the agency had a reputation for being "harsh". Accordingly, in assessing the
validity of Khadr's allegations, I must take into account there is a credible risk
that torture may have occurred, as recounted by Khadr, with respect to the three
days following his arrest.
I find as a fact that Khadr was mistreated immediately following his arrest
by the ISI but not to the extent he alleges. In a colloquy with counsel, counsel
for the Attorney General took no serious issue with a finding of ill treatment.
Counsel for the Attorney General put it this way: "I don't think it is in dispute
that there was some sort of rough treatment that occurred immediately upon arrest. The extent of that rough treatment and whether it is precisely as described
in his affidavit, that's another matter." Evidence in Justice Mosley's summaries
supports a finding of mistreatment.
Without in any way minimizing the abuse suffered, I am not satisfied, on a
balance of probabilities, that the mistreatment of Khadr reached the level of severity alleged. I do not find evidence amounting to torture. I come to this conclusion for two reasons.
First, Khadr's initial disclosure of abuse to Christine is markedly different
from the allegations set forth in his affidavit. Khadr never discloses to Christine
the acts of sexual humiliation he alleges in his affidavit. Moreover, the beatings
he relates to Christine take place over a very confined period of time — two
hours — rather than the entire three day period leading up to the United States
commencing their interrogations. In this respect, it is of significance that Khadr
tells Christine that "when it became clear that he was willing to cooperate with
Pakistani authorities" the beatings stopped and an apology was forthcoming the
next day. I found Christine to be a truthful and reliable witness who accurately
recounted the remarks uttered to her by Khadr. These remarks cast doubt on the
reliability of the extent of the abuse Khadr suffered and not on the fact of abuse
having occurred. In coming to this conclusion, I am cognizant of the data of
experience that individuals who are victims of abuse, and particularly sexual
abuse, do not necessarily disclose the full extent of the abuse immediately: in
many cases they do not.
Secondly, and more importantly, there were aspects of Khadr's evidence that
simply were not credible. The most vivid example relates to his assertion that,
during the course of the Pearson statement on December 2, 2005, Detective Inspector Shourie became angry when Christine — whom Khadr believed was a
representative of the Canadian Embassy — entered the room during the course
of the interview. Khadr states in his affidavit that when people from the Canadian Embassy came into the room, Detective Inspector Shourie became angry
and told them to leave. Detective Inspector Shourie was upset and told them he
was going to report them because they were interfering with the interview. As a
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result, according to Khadr, the Embassy officials left without a word of
assistance.
104
This was clearly not the case. The videotape of the interview demonstrates
the conduct attributed to Detective Inspector Shourie simply did not occur and,
indeed, that Christine offered Khadr fifty dollars for a cab ride home and wished
him good luck.
105

In conclusion, I am not satisfied on a balance of probabilities that the mistreatment of Khadr was at a level amounting to torture. However, I am satisfied
he was the victim of ill treatment, including physical abuse, by the ISI. I would,
without hesitation, have found he was tortured if I accepted all the allegations
set forth in Khadr's affidavit. That said, I am also satisfied that, from the beginning of his detention, and after being initially physically abused by the ISI and
being confined in a hostile environment, Khadr's well founded fear of his captors is a factor I take into account as an influence on his future conduct over the
fourteen months in detention.
ii. By a United States Intelligence Agency

106

Justice Mosley, with the benefit of a full record, determined the United
States intelligence agency's interrogation of Khadr was for intelligence and security purposes only. Khadr alleges the United States intelligence agency which
interrogated him for seventeen days threatened him and his sister and, on one
occasion, an intelligence officer slapped him. The threats and the slap are denied
in the SROC #3; that account is presumptively reliable. Moreover, I have, as
indicated in the previous section, doubts with respect to the reliability of some,
not all, of Khadr's allegations. While, undoubtedly, Khadr was subjected to very
lengthy, and vigorous interviews by a United States intelligence agency, I am
not satisfied he was slapped or threatened.
//. Did the United States Know That Khadr Would Be Subjected to
Mistreatment in Pakistan?

107

Counsel for Khadr does not assert that members of this intelligence agency
had actual knowledge that Khadr would be subjected to torture or other harsh
treatment. It is asserted, however, given Pakistan's reputation for violating
human rights, the American intelligence agency would have constructive knowledge that abuses were likely to occur upon Khadr's arrest.
108
Given my findings with respect to Pakistan's troubled record, there is a credible risk that people detained for intelligence purposes in Pakistan may be subjected to mistreatment. While I am satisfied that the United States did not order
or have any direct knowledge that Khadr would be mistreated by the Pakistani
authorities, it is difficult to imagine that mistreatment of Khadr by the ISI would
come as a surprise to this intelligence agency, given Pakistan's notorious reputation for physical abuse and mistreatment.
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///. The Bounty
109
The fact that a bounty was paid for the arrest of Khadr did not come to light
until the unredacted disclosure released by Justice Mosley on April 29, 2008.
There is no issue that $500,000 was paid to the ISI for Khadr's capture. This
was a private bounty that received no publicity. At the commencement of these
proceedings, in the ROC and the SROCs, no mention was made of the bounty.
Until the release of Justice Mosley's decision, it appeared that Pakistan was the
directing mind behind the capture and arrest of Khadr, and that the role of the
United States was to participate in his interrogation for the intelligence reasons
previously stated.
110
When evidence of the bounty was disclosed, the expanded role played by the
United States with respect to Khadr's detention became evident. I agree however
with the submission of the Attorney General that it would be wrong to attribute
bad faith to the United States because Canada sought to protect this information
on grounds of national security in the s. 38 CEA proceeding. Justice Mosley
found, with the benefit of a full record, that Canada's claims were legitimately
based.
111
Be that as it may, the disclosure of the bounty, the almost immediate access
of a team of American intelligence investigators to interview Khadr following
his arrest, and the subsequent actions of the United States to delay consular access and to delay Khadr's repatriation to Canada lead me ineluctably to conclude
the United States a driving force behind Khadr's capture and detention in Pakistan. I am satisfied that while the ISI had the final say on all matters relating to
Khadr's detention, the payment of the bounty heavily influenced the ISI to act in
accordance with the United States agency's wishes.
IV. Delay in According Consular Rights
112
Under the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, a contracting state has
a duty to inform a detainee of his right to contact consular officials and to facilitate that right without delay. Pakistan, since 1964, has been a signatory to the
Vienna Convention. Canada's communique to Pakistan prior to Khadr's arrest
clearly sets forth Canada's expectation that his consular rights would be
observed.
113
Khadr was detained for a period of three months before being permitted consular access. I find as a fact that this delay was prompted by the Pakistani and
American collaborative decision to refuse consular access until full intelligence
debriefings were completed.
114
Pakistan did not initially notify CSIS or DFAIT of Khadr's arrest. Indeed,
Pakistan never publicly acknowledged the detention of Khadr. CSIS was privately advised by a United States intelligence agency on October 24, 2004 of
Khadr's detention. In that communique, the United States agency requested
CSIS allow intelligence aspects to play out before official representations were
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made by the government of Canada. It is to be noted that, at this point in time,
Khadr's interrogation was in its fifth day.
John arranged a meeting with his ISI counterpart on October 28, 2004. The
ISI refused to acknowledge Khadr was in their custody. John was of the view
the ISI were stalling: I agree. The reason for the stall was to permit the interrogation of Khadr by United States intelligence officials to continue until intelligence imperatives were completed.
On November 10, 2004, when a senior ISI officer finally acknowledged to
John that Khadr was in their custody, that agency continued to raise concerns
about agreeing to consular access on grounds it would interfere with the
debriefings.
Even in early December 2004, the United States intelligence agency still did
not want Khadr to have consular access. That agency asked for continued "patience" from CSIS because Khadr was required to be in detention to potentially
identify locations where Al Qaeda members might be found.
Finally, consular access was granted for the first time on January 12, 2005.
At that time, an ISI official was monitoring this consular visit. In addition, it was
John's evidence that it was assumed that all visits with Khadr were being videotaped and audio recorded.
In the presence of Pakistani officials, or in the case of electronic monitoring
of visits, it is unlikely that complaints with respect to mistreatment could be
given in a full and candid fashion, for fear of retribution. It is not without significance that Khadr tells Christine on their flight back to Canada that this was the
first time he could tell somebody what had happened to him.
I am fully satisfied that the United States and Pakistan collaborated to deny
prompt consular access to Khadr. There can be no doubt that intelligence objectives, specifically the interrogation of Khadr, trumped the fundamental right to
prompt consular access guaranteed by the Vienna Convention.
In the Maher Arar report, at p. 354, Commissioner O'Connor recommended
that Canadian officials should normally insist on respect of all of a detainee's
consular rights. Even if the rights are denied, the insistence sends a signal that
Canada disapproves of any failure to fully respect a detainee's rights. Canada
did its best to obtain consular access. DFAIT documentation dated January 4,
2005 confirms that DFAIT and CSIS pressed hard for consular access. Efforts
through Pakistan's Minister of Foreign Affairs to gain access were unsuccessful.
Only through a continuation of strong representations by Canada did the ISI
agree that an officer from Canada's High Commission could meet with Khadr.
I am satisfied that, in spite of Canada's strong efforts to obtain consular access, Pakistan, in concert with the United States, delayed such access for three
months, much to the frustration of both John and DFAIT.
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V. The Delay in the Repatriation of Khadr
123

In a previous section of these reasons, I set out the events leading up to the
cancellation of Khadr's anticipated release and repatriation to Canada on June
15, 2005. Canada wanted Khadr released and repatriated, and worked towards
that end. At that time, there was no evidence to form the basis for the laying of
any criminal charges. The United States disagreed with the decision to repatriate
Khadr. I find as a fact, consistent with the evidence of John, that the United
States applied pressure to Pakistan to cancel Khadr's release. As a result, Khadr
spent a further six months in detention while the United States arranged for FBI
agents to interview Khadr for criminal prosecution purposes, as well as to set the
wheels in motion for Khadr's possible rendition to the United States or, alternatively, to begin the extradition process to Canada. During that time, the United
States attempted to prevail upon Pakistan and Canada to have Khadr sent directly to the United States. Canada refused to consent and Pakistan declined to
send Khadr to the United States absent Canada's consent.
VI. Summary of My Findings

124

A summary of my findings is as follows:
1.

Khadr was captured in Islamabad, Pakistan by the ISI at the behest of the
United States, who paid a $500,000 bounty for his arrest.

2.

Khadr was initially sought by American officials solely for intelligence
purposes and not for criminal prosecution purposes.

3.

I am satisfied that Khadr's detention by the ISI was both arbitrary and
illegal, according to the law of Pakistan.

4.

During his initial three days of detention, Khadr was mistreated and
physically abused, but not on the level of severity he alleges in his affidavit. I am satisfied that the United States intelligence agency did not
have actual knowledge that Khadr would be abused when it paid the
bounty for his arrest. However, I am equally satisfied this agency ought
to have known that there was a credible risk he would be mistreated.

5.

Khadr's rights to consular access without delay were denied by Pakistan.
The United States and Pakistan collaborated in this delay in order to facilitate the completion of American intelligence interrogations.

6.

I am satisfied for reasons previously stated that the United States intelligence agency pressured the ISI to delay Khadr's repatriation to Canada
for a period of six months. The delay was caused by American dissatisfaction with the decision to return Khadr to Canada without charges being laid. This delay was contrary to Canadian officials' expectations and
wishes that Khadr be repatriated. It was a source of frustration: Canadian
officials had fully expected Khadr to be released and had made preparations for his return to Canada.
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The Law

/. Stay of Proceedings
125
The legal principles articulated by the Supreme Court of Canada that govern
the granting of a stay of proceedings pursuant to s. 24(1) of the Charter are
found in the leading cases of/?, v. O'Connor, [1995] 4 S.C.R. 411 (S.C.C.),
Canada (Minister of Citizenship & Immigration) v. Tobiass, [1997] 3 S.C.R. 391
(S.C.C.), and R. v. Regan, [2002] 1 S.C.R. 297 (S.C.C.).
126
The principles found in those cases have been distilled in the recent Ontario
Court of Appeal decision of R. v. Zarinchang, 2010 ONCA 286 (Ont. C.A.), as
follows (at para. 57):
(1)

There are two categories of cases that may attract a stay of proceedings. The first category implicates the fairness of an individual's trial
resulting from state misconduct. The second involves a residual category unrelated to the fairness of the trial, but involves state conduct
that contravenes fundamental notions of justice, which undermines
the integrity of the judicial process.

(2)

In considering whether to grant a stay of proceedings under either of
the above categories, the following criteria must be satisfied:

(3)

127

(i)

the prejudice caused by the abuse in question will be manifested, perpetuated or aggravated through the conduct of the
trial, or by its outcome; it must be directed at prospective
prejudice, not to redress past prejudice; and

(ii)

no other remedy is reasonably capable of removing that
prejudice.

In cases in either of the above categories where there remains some
uncertainty as to whether the abuse is sufficiently serious to create
the prejudice to warrant a stay, there is a third criterion that the court
may consider — the balancing of the interests in granting a stay
against society's interest in having a trial on the merits.

In an extradition context, the case of United States v. Cobb, [2001] 1 S.C.R.
587 (S.C.C.) is a leading case relevant to issues raised in this proceeding. In
Cobb a stay of proceedings was granted based on a finding that the Requesting
State, the United States of America, had disentitled itself to the benefit it sought,
the extradition of Cobb, by the application of undue pressure to a Canadian citizen to forego due legal process in Canada. In the present proceeding, counsel
differ in their interpretation of Cobb and whether a stay is only appropriate
where the fairness of the extradition hearing has been compromised.

//. Positions of the Parties
128
The position of the applicant is the United States is complicit in the shocking
treatment accorded Khadr in Pakistan during his fourteen months in secret detention and this is one of those exceptional cases, the clearest of cases, that war-
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rants a stay. The applicant submits a stay ought to be granted in respect of each
of the two categories of abuse of process: first, the fairness of the proceedings
has been implicated and, secondly, the residual category has been engaged,
where the conduct complained of involves misconduct by the requesting state at
such a high level of seriousness as to tarnish the integrity of the administration
of justice.
129
The Attorney General submits Khadr is an untrustworthy witness and there
is no credible evidence to link any mistreatment of the applicant, particularly
torture, to the United States during his detention. The Attorney General argues
that the granting of a stay of proceedings at an extradition hearing must be directly tied to the fairness of the hearing. The Attorney General says the fairness
of this extradition hearing has not been in any way compromised. In this respect,
the decision in Cobb is restricted to cases where the conduct of officials from the
Requesting State interferes or attempts to interfere with the conduct of judicial
proceedings in Canada.
130
The Attorney General submits that allegations of abuse of process that do
not interfere with the conduct of the extradition hearing such as matters relating
to the bounty and the decision to delay Khadr's release from detention and repatriation are matters for the Minister of Justice to consider at the surrender stage
of the proceedings. The Attorney General points to the powers of the Minister
found in s. 44(1) of the Extradition Act, which provides as follows:
44.(1) The Minister shall refuse to make a surrender order if the Minister is
satisfied that
(a)

131

the surrender would be unjust or oppressive
having
regard
to
all
the
relevant
circumstances;...

Further, the Attorney General contends that even if I find a nexus between
the abuse of the applicant and the United States or Canada, a fact strenuously
denied, this is not the "clearest of cases" meriting a stay.

///. Application of Findings of Fact to the Law with Respect to Abuse of
Process
132
As indicated, the law distinguishes between two categories of cases that may
attract a stay of proceedings: one that implicates the fairness of the proceeding,
resulting from state misconduct, and the other involving the residual category,
unrelated to the fairness of the hearing, but involving state conduct which undermines the integrity of the judicial process.
133
I find that this case, at its heart, falls into the residual category: one of those
exceptional cases that involves state misconduct that contravenes fundamental
notions of justice, and which undermines the justice system. The extrajudicial
misconduct in this case does not, in the narrow procedural sense, compromise
the fairness of this extradition hearing. However, that is not to say the conduct of
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the Requesting State is not linked or connected to this proceeding. I disagree
with the submission by counsel for the Attorney General that there is no nexus
between the abuse and the fairness of this hearing. On the contrary, in a broader
sense, the gross misconduct that occurred in Pakistan very much affects these
proceedings in Canada. The basis of this case has its genesis in the serious misconduct by the Requesting State. The Requesting State is seeking a benefit from
this court, committal, based on evidence derived from its own misconduct.
134

With respect to the residual category, Tobiass, at paragraph 91, the Supreme
Court distilled certain legal principles pertinent to a stay, derived from
O'Connor, as follows:
For a stay of proceedings to be appropriate in a case falling into the residual
category, it must appear that the state misconduct is likely to continue in the
future or that the carrying forward of the prosecution will offend society's
sense of justice. Ordinarily, the latter condition will not be met unless the
former is as well — society will not take umbrage at the carrying forward of
a prosecution unless it is likely that some form of misconduct will continue.
There may be exceptional cases in which the past misconduct is so egregious that the mere fact of going forward in the light of it will be offensive. But such cases should be relatively very rare.
[emphasis added]
And at paragraph 96:
A stay is not a form of punishment. It is not a kind of retribution against the
state and it is not a general deterrent. If it is appropriate to use punitive language at all, then probably the best way to describe a stay is as a specific
deterrent — a remedy aimed at preventing the perpetuation or aggravation of a particular abuse. Admittedly, if a past abuse were serious
enough, then public confidence in the administration of justice could be
so undermined that the mere act of carrying forward in the light of it
would constitute a new and ongoing abuse sufficient to warrant a stay of
proceedings.
[emphasis added]
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Counsel for the applicant brought to the court's attention three extradition
cases in which stays of proceedings were granted: United States v. Tollman,
[2006] OJ. No. 3672 (Ont. S.C.J.); United States v. Licht, [2002] B.C.J. No.
1814 (B.C. S.C.); and United Kingdom of Great Britain & Northern Ireland v.
Tarantino, [2003] B.C.J. No. 1696 (B.C. S.C.).

136

The case of Tollman has similar features to the present one. In both Tollman
and the present case, extradition was a last resort. In Tollman, prior to initiating
extradition proceedings, the United States set out to thwart the Canadian extradition process by seeking to use the Canadian immigration system to effect his
removal to the United States. When it became apparent that the extradition process would be required, Tollman's release from jail was delayed for ten days to
allow the extradition request to be made.
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In her analysis of the law, Molloy J. stated at paragraph 18
An extradition judge has the power to stay proceedings for abuse of process
both at common law and under the Charter on the same principles established in O'Connor: Cobb at paras. 39 and 49. The extent of that power must
be analyzed within the context in which it arises: United States of America v.
Dynar, [1997] 2 S.C.R. 462, 115 C.C.C. 93d) 481; United States of America
v. Yang (2001), 56 O.R. (3d) 52, 157 C.C.C. (3d) 225 (C.A.). It does not
expand the limited role of the extradition judge under the Extradition Act,
but neither is the power so circumscribed that it applies only where the abuse
relates directly to the sufficiency of the evidence issue to be determined by
the extradition judge. The focus must be on the Canadian judicial process.
The abuse power cannot be used to remedy the actions of foreign states
outside our borders, nor can it be invoked in respect of any perceived unfairness of the ultimate trial to be held in the foreign state. However, the power
applies to any conduct that reaches into this jurisdiction and undermines the integrity of judicial system here: Cobb at paras. 21-40, and cases
referred to therein.
[emphasis added]

138

In staying the proceedings, Justice Molloy stated at paragraph 149
Misconduct of this sort cannot ever be tolerated, for to do so is to condone,
perhaps even to invite, similar conduct in the future. This is the kind of conduct that offends this community's sense of fair play and decency. Having
conducted itself in this manner, the requesting state is disentitled to any relief
from this court.

139

Like Tollman, the conduct in this case reaches right into these proceedings
and cannot be ignored.

140

In Licht, a stay was imposed. In the case, United States authorities conducted
a "reverse sting" operation in British Columbia without the consent of the
RCMP, in order to obtain evidence upon which to base the ROC. The court
found the wrongdoing and illegality by Drug Enforcement Agency (DBA) officials so offensive to Canadian society as to constitute an abuse of process disentitling the requesting state from the assistance of the court.

141

In Tarantino, a stay was granted in circumstances where the certification of
the ROC contained certain important inaccuracies. The lack of diligence and
care exercised by the Requesting State was so serious that a stay was warranted
on the basis that the court must control the integrity of the process.

142

In each of these cases, a stay of proceedings was issued on the basis that the
conduct attributable to the Requesting State was so serious that the court was
required to act in order to protect its own integrity. The conduct complained of
in each of those cases, while extremely serious, pales in comparison to the violation of Khadr's rights.
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The Attorney General argues that any abuses or misconduct found ought to
be resolved following the committal stage, by the Minister, pursuant to sections
44(1) and (2) of the Extradition Act.
144
In Cobb, at paragraphs 36-37, the Supreme Court of Canada reiterated Ihe
common law doctrine of abuse of process was not extinguished by section 7 of
the Charter and that, at paragraph 44,
The Minister is not the guardian of the integrity of the courts. It is for the
courts themselves to guard and preserve their integrity.

And further at paragraph 48
... the existence of potential remedies at the executive stage does not oust the
jurisdiction of the courts to control their own process in cases such as here,
where the courts are required to preserve the integrity of their own
proceedings.
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I find that, notwithstanding section 44(1) of the Extradition Act gives the
Minister authority to refuse a surrender order if the Minister is satisfied the surrender would be unjust or oppressive, this jurisdiction is not exclusive to the
Minister in circumstances where the conduct of the Requesting State is so
shocking that a committal order would amount to an abuse of process.
The Attorney General seeks support for its position that matters of misconduct by the requesting state ought to be left to the minister in the case of United
States v. Hulley, [2007] B.C.J. No. 1470 (B.C. S.C.). In Hulley, the applicant, a
citizen of the United States, brought an application to stay the proceedings. Hulley's flight to Canada was precipitated by a letter he received from a prosecutor
in the state of Washington indicating, that if a plea bargain agreement was not
accepted, a significantly longer sentence would be sought if Hulley was found
guilty following a trial. The extradition court did not grant the stay of proceedings, holding that the possibility of severe punishment upon conviction in the
United States was a matter for the Minister to consider, not the court.
The issue in Hulley was appropriately left to the Minister because it was
related solely to the United States' prosecution of the person sought. The domestic dealings of a prosecutor and a person charged in respect of plea bargains
simply had no nexus or connection with the extradition process. Hulley was not
a Canadian citizen: he fled the United States to Canada to avoid prosecution.
The courts will not interfere with the extradition proceeding when the misconduct has no connection to Canada's extradition process. Unlike the present
case, the facts in Hulley did not raise issues which impacted on the integrity of
the extradition court.
On the other hand, the recent case of R. v. Tran, 2010 ONCA 471 (Ont.
C.A.), while not an extradition case, is an example of where the appellate court
of this province imposed a stay as a remedy in order to distance itself from
serious pre-trial misconduct by the police and to affirm fundamental values of
our society. Tran is a case involving police brutality that occurred shortly after
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the accused voluntarily surrendered to police in respect to outstanding charges.
Evidence of cover up exacerbated the situation. Epstein J.A., writing on behalf
of an unanimous court at paragraph 106 said:
It is essential for the court to distance itself from this kind of state misconduct — an unwarranted, grave assault causing bodily harm, delayed medical
attention, a cover up that included perjury, a prosecutorial response that affected the perception of trial fairness and no effective response. Not to do so
would be to leave the impression that it tacitly approves of it. The granting of a stay of proceedings affirms the fundamental values of our society
and ensures that the rights under the Charter are not, in substance,
meaningless.
[emphasis added]

IV. The Clearest of Cases
150
I recognize that the collection of reliable intelligence is of the highest importance in protecting and securing a nation from the dangers of terrorism. It must
also be recognized that there will always be a tension, especially in troubled
times, in the balancing of intelligence and security issues with cherished democratic values, such as the rule of law and protection from human rights violations. In civilized democracies, the rule of law must prevail over intelligence
objectives. In this case, the sum of the human rights violations suffered by
Khadr is both shocking and unjustifiable. Although Khadr may have possessed
information of intelligence value, he is still entitled to the safeguards and benefit
of the law, and not to arbitrary and illegal detention in a secret detention centre
where he was subjected to physical abuse. The United States was the driving
force behind Khadr's fourteen month detention in Pakistan, paying a $500,000
bounty for his apprehension. The United States intelligence agency acted in concert with the ISI to delay consular access by DFAIT to Khadr for three months,
contrary to the provisions of the Vienna Convention. The United States, contrary
to Canada's wishes, pressured the ISI to delay Khadr's repatriation because of
its dissatisfaction with Khadr being released without charge, even though there
was no admissible evidence upon which to base charges at that time. In my
view, given this gross misconduct, there cannot be a clearer case that warrants a
stay.
151
In issuing a stay of proceedings, it is not, in the words of Tobiass, a form of
punishment to the requesting state, but rather a specific deterrent; that is, a remedy aimed at preventing similar abuse in the future. It is also aimed at this court
dissociating itself with the conduct of the requesting state.
The Admissibility of the Three Statements
152
In the event that I have fallen into error by imposing a stay of proceedings, it
is appropriate that I make findings with respect to the admissibility of each of
the three statements, which form the underpinnings of the extradition request.
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/. Statement to FBI in Pakistan
153

Evidence gathered in a foreign state and included in the ROC is presumptively reliable and thus admissible at an extradition hearing. Nevertheless, there
are two avenues upon which evidence collected in a foreign state may be excluded at an extradition hearing.
('. Manifestly

Unreliable Evidence

154

In United States v. Ferras (2006), 209 C.C.C. (3d) 353 (S.C.C.), McLachlin
CJC. held that extradition judges possess a limited ability to weigh evidence at
an extradition hearing in order to determine whether the evidence meets the
committal standard. Defective, unreliable, or otherwise unavailable evidence,
upon which it would be unsafe or dangerous to convict, would not go to a jury
and would not be sufficient to meet the test for committal.

155

McLachlin CJC. described the powers of the extradition judge as follows, at
para. 40:
If the extradition judge possesses neither the ability to declare unreliable evidence inadmissible nor to weigh and consider the sufficiency of the evidence, committal for extradition could occur in circumstances where committal for trial in Canada would not be justified. I take as axiomatic that a
person could not be committed for trial for an offence in Canada if the evidence is so manifestly unreliable that it would be unsafe to rest a verdict
upon it. It follows that if a judge on an extradition hearing concludes that the
evidence is manifestly unreliable, the judge should not order extradition
under s. 29(1)... Similarly, I take it as axiomatic that a person could not be
committed to trial for an offence in Canada if the evidence put against the
person is not available for trial.
[emphasis added]

156

Thus, where the evidence contained in the ROC is manifestly unreliable, it
cannot be relied upon to determine whether a committal order should issue.

157

I am satisfied that the evidence gathered by the FBI agents in Pakistan is
manifestly unreliable.

158

in coming to that conclusion, I am not subjecting this statement to the voluntariness evaluation, required by Canadian rules of evidence, that an inculpatory
statement must be proven voluntary beyond a reasonable doubt. However, it is
wise to keep in mind that the rationale for reliability of a voluntary statement has
its roots in the concept that what people freely say, which is contrary to their
interests, is probably true. If it is prompted by threat or inducement, it can no
longer be presumed to be true. See R. v. Hodgson, [1998] 2 S.C.R. 449 (S.C.C.)
at para. 17. Accordingly, in determining whether a statement given to authorities
is manifestly unreliable, the entire circumstances relating to Khadr's detention
are important.
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In concluding the statement taken in Pakistan is manifestly unreliable, I take
into account the following factors:
• Khadr was held in secret detention for a period of nine months prior to
the statement being received by the FBI agents. The detention was both
arbitrary and illegal. During that nine month period of detention, Khadr
was interrogated repeatedly by Pakistani, American and Canadian intelligence agencies. He had been beaten when captured and subjected to
other mistreatment. In such circumstances, I accept that Khadr understood, if he failed to cooperate with authorities or departed from statements previously given to various intelligence agencies, he faced a realistic risk of further mistreatment.
• Khadr had no meaningful opportunity to consult with counsel.
• Khadr was handcuffed and shackled on each of the three days he was
interviewed by FBI agents. Moreover, I accept as a fact that each day of
the interview was extremely lengthy in duration.
• The evidence is that ISI officers were not always present during the
course of the three days of FBI interviews. Nevertheless, a camera was in
the interview room and I find that Khadr was being, at all times, electronically monitored. I note, in the disclosure released by Justice Mosley,
that an ISI officer stated, "a U.S. agency never had access to Khadr without ISI being present and that, off the record, all the interviews of the
U.S. agency conducted were recorded." This is consistent with the evidence given by John relating to his assumption of electronic monitoring
and it is improbable, in my view, that the FBI statements would not also
be monitored.
• The FBI was not permitted to video or audio record the statement for law
enforcement purposes.
160
it is important to bear in mind, as a parallel experience, the RCMP attempt to
secure a legally admissible statement from Khadr in Pakistan. Detective Inspector Shourie determined the tight restrictions imposed by the ISI, such as the refusal to permit Khadr access to a lawyer, the refusal to permit the use of videotape equipment, and the refusal to allow the interview to proceed in the absence
of an ISI officer, made the taking of such a voluntary statement impossible. The
circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness were not permitted. These same restrictions confronted the FBI agents when they interviewed Khadr in July 2005.
161
It is apparent the FBI agents were concerned about the circumstances under
which the statement in Pakistan was received. The hostile and oppressive environment in which the first statement was taken posed significant legal challenges. It was not a coincidence that the FBI agents were at Pearson Airport
seeking an opportunity to re-interview Khadr upon his arrival back in Canada:
an opportunity that did not materialize for a further two days. I find the purpose
of the second FBI interview was to conduct such an interview under conditions,
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and with appropriate additional safeguards, that would he more conducive to the
taking of a voluntary statement.
ii. Evidence Gathered in an Abusive Manner Pursuant to United States v.
Shulman
162

In United States v. Shulman, [2001] 1 S.C.R. 616 (S.C.C.) at para. 56, Arbour J. articulated the following principle in an extradition context:
An extradition judge has the power to exclude evidence under s. 2492) of the
Charter as a remedy for a violation a fugitive's constitutional rights. The
Charter applies only domestically and has no effect extraterritorially, except
to Canadian authorities: R. v.Cook, [1998] 2 S.C.R. 597. However, in an appropriate case, the extradition judge could exclude evidence gathered by the
foreign authorities in such an abusive manner that its admission per se would
be unfair under s. 7 of the Charter: United States ofAmericav. Dynar, [ 1997]
2 S.C.R. 462; R. v. Harrer, [1995] 3 S.C.R. 562.
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For reasons stated in the preceding section relating to evidence manifestly
unreliable, and for reasons articulated relating to the stay of proceedings, I
would also exclude the statement taken by FBI agents in Pakistan on the basis
the evidence was gathered in an abusive manner, pursuant to the principles articulated in Shulman.
II. The Statement Made at Pearson Airport
I would find the statement received by Detective Inspector Shourie from
Khadr at the Pearson Airport has been proven voluntary beyond a reasonable
doubt. Given that the statement was gathered in Canada, by Canadian officials,
it is required that the statement meet proper Canadian evidentiary standards
under section 32(2) of the Extradition Act. This case is another example of the
desirability of video records. The video and audio record clearly demonstrates
that there was no environment of oppression that existed in the interview room. I
note that the interview room was not locked and Khadr was repeatedly told he
could leave whenever he wanted.

The conduct of Detective Inspector Shourie was exemplary. Khadr was
made aware that he was not under arrest and was, as indicated, free to leave at
any time. He was specifically told to disregard any statements he may have
made in Pakistan. No promises or threats were made to Khadr in order to induce
a statement. Even though he was not under detention, Khadr was fully advised
of his right to counsel and his right to silence.
166
The video recording further indicates there was nothing harsh or aggressive
about the manner in which questions were posed. The period of the questioning
was reasonable. Khadr's demeanour was relaxed and he did not in any way appear intimidated.
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Khadr was clearly aware of what he was saying and did not demonstrate,
during the course of the interview, anything that would indicate that he did not
have a full operating mind.

168

With respect to the issue of an operating mind, Dr. Payne did not suggest
that Khadr lacked an operating mind or was in any way disconnected from reality. I agree with Dr. First's assessment, confirmed by viewing the videotaped
statement, that "the most credible explanation for the absence of visible signs of
anxiety and fear is that Khadr was not particularly fearful during these interviews, given his misplaced confidence that admitting to procuring weapons
would not get him into trouble."

169

Mr. Whitling argues that the statement taken at Pearson Airport and the
statement taken at the Delta Hotel are both contaminated or tainted by the excluded statement received by the FBI in Pakistan and relies upon the "derived
confession rule". The legal principles with respect to derived confessions are set
out in R. v. I. (L.R.), [1993] 4 S.C.R. 504 (S.C.C.) at p. 526:
Under the rules relating to confessions at common law, the admissibility of a
confession which had been preceded by an involuntary confession involved a
factual determination based on factors designed to ascertain the degree of
connection between the two statements. These included the time span between the statements, advertence to the previous statement during questioning, the discovery of additional incriminating evidence subsequent to the first
statement, the presence of the same police officers at both interrogations and
other similarities between the two circumstances.
In applying these factors, a subsequent confession would be involuntary if
either the tainting features which disqualified the first confession continued
to be present or if the fact that the first statement was made was a substantial
factor contributing to the making of the second statement.

170

In considering these factors, and unlike the interview that subsequently took
place at the Delta Hotel, Detective Inspector Shourie conducted himself in an
impeccable manner by not referring at all to Khadr's earlier statement in Pakistan. Moreover, Detective Inspector Shourie cautioned Khadr to disregard any
statements he may have made in Pakistan. Detective Inspector Shourie had no
connection with the FBI statement. While he had the advantage of having interviewed Khadr in Pakistan three months prior to the FBI statement, the videotape
of the Pearson interview depicts his conduct as transparent and fair. Accordingly, the fact that Detective Inspector Shourie had interviewed Khadr previously is of no consequence.
///. The Delta Hotel Statement

171

The same FBI agents who received Khadr's statement in Pakistan in July
2005 took his second statement, approximately five months later, at the Delta
Hotel. I excluded the first statement taken in Pakistan for reasons given. The
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issue in respect of the Delta statement is whether this statement contravenes the
derived confession rule and, if so, ought to be excluded. The degree of connection between the two statements must be determined. As noted above, those factors include:

172
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•
•

The time span between the statements;
Advertence to the previous statement during questioning;

•

The discovery of additional incriminating evidence subsequent to the
first statement;

• The presence of the same police officers at both interrogations; and
• Other similarities between the two circumstances.
No single factor is determinative of admissibility.
In the present case, the fact that Khadr voluntarily went to the meeting with
the FBI five months after his initial statement, that he was not under arrest and
that he was cautioned are factors that weigh in favour of admissibility. Indeed,
had the statement been taken in the same independent manner as Detective Inspector Shourie demonstrated with respect to the Pearson statement two days
prior, I would have, without hesitation, admitted the statement. However, it is
clear that the purpose of the FBI was to have Khadr affirm all of the details he
provided in his Pakistan statement. From beginning to end, the FBI averted to
the Pakistan statement in order to confirm what he had previously said. It is
important to emphasize the overwhelming extent to which the first statement
was used during the questioning.
The FBI agents initially stated that they wanted to clarify information from
the previous interview. What occurred was, in effect, a cross-examination of
Khadr with respect to details previously given in Pakistan. For example, the FBI
agents frequently started a question with the phrase, "when you talked to us
before, you said..." Khadr was coaxed to remember specific aspects of the Pakistan statement by saying, "you remember you told us the story..."
One of the reasons I excluded the Pakistan statement was that it was manifestly unreliable. A statement derived from that inadmissible statement, taken in
an oppressive and hostile environment, cannot be said to be reliable. I see no
reason in logic not to apply derivative evidence principles where a subsequent
statement is contaminated in an overwhelming fashion by the virtual cross-examination on an inadmissible statement.

Conclusion
176
I have ruled that a stay of proceedings pursuant to section 24( 1) of the Charter shall issue. If I erred in this decision, I would have committed Khadr, based
upon his remarks contained in the Pearson statement, on the following Canadian
offences set forth in the ATP:
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•

Conspiracy to traffic in weapons contrary to sections 99 and 465(1 )(c) of
the Criminal Code;

•

Directly or indirectly providing or making property available knowing
that, in whole or in part, it will be used by or will benefit a terrorist
groups contrary to section 83.03(b) of the Criminal Code;

•

Knowingly participating in or contributing to, directly or indirectly, any
activity of a terrorist group for the purpose of enhancing the ability of the
terrorist group to facilitate or carry out terrorist activity contrary to section 83.18 of the Criminal Code;

•

Commission of an indictable offence for the benefit of, at the direction
of, or in association with, a terrorist group contrary to section 83.2 of the
Criminal Code.
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In arriving at this conclusion, the Attorney General concedes, based on a
finding of fact that only the Pearson statement is admissible, there is no evidence
of the offence of possession of an explosive substance contrary to section 82(1)
of the Criminal Code.
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in the result, a stay of proceedings shall issue, pursuant to section 24(1) of
the Charter.
Application granted.

